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Introduction
Ethnocentrism leads to a blind and distorted vision of the world-
that all countries are wrong except one's own. A superpower which be-
lieves that only its own constitutional guarantees should be respected ex-
hibits disdain for international law and the world community.
Modem times should bring more international cooperation, more
trade, and more communication. They should bring understanding
among the nations of the world and mutual respect among legal systems.
Universal cooperation is not simply important; it is opprobrious to show
disrespect for international law. This Article focuses primarily on ex-
plaining the legal procedure of extradition and criticizing its lawless al-
ternative-abducting people from other countries.
The United States Supreme Court's 1992 decision in United States v.
Alvarez-Machain1 reflects the Court's current disdain for international
law and fails to interpret the bilateral extradition treaty between the
United States and Mexico2 in light of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties3 and the Charter of the United Nations. The Supreme
Court's decision ominously fails to recognize the incorporation of inter-
national law into American law.
In Alvarez-Machain, the Court held that the United States govern-
ment's abduction of a foreign citizen from his homeland would not pro-
hibit his trial in a United States court for violations of this country's
criminal laws.4 The decision recognized that a defendant may not be
prosecuted in violation of the terms of an extradition treaty,5 but held
that the United States-Mexico extradition treaty was not violated in this
1. 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
2. Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059 [hereinafter Extradition
Treaty].
3. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/27 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
4. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2197. Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a gynecologist
accused of using his medical expertise to keep Enrique Camarena, an agent with the United
States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), alive while Camarena was tortured and interrogated
in Mexico in 1985, was abducted from his office in Guadalajara in 1990 and forced aboard an
airplane to El Paso where he was then "arrested" by U.S. officials. The United States Supreme
Court ruled that his detention did not violate the extradition treaty between the United States
and Mexico. On December 14, 1992, after spending three years in jail, he was acquitted by
District Judge Edward Rafeedie because of lack of evidence against him. He sued DEA offi-
cials and filed a separate $20 million damage claim against the Justice Department on July 9,
1993 for violations of his civil rights. See Pandora's Box: Supreme Court ruling on kidnapping
out of bounds, Hous. CHRON., Editorial, June 16, 1992, at A18; Doctor Abducted in Camarena
Case Sues U.S. Officials, Reuter, July 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER
File.
5. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2191.
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case6 because the treaty does not expressly prohibit abduction.7 The
Court concluded that general principles of international law provide no
basis for interpreting the treaty to include an implied prohibition of inter-
national abductions. While conceding that Alvarez-Machain may have
been correct in that his abduction was shocking and in violation of gen-
eral international law principles, the decision whether he should be re-
turned to Mexico was a matter for the executive branch.8 Paradoxically,
six months after this decision, United States District Judge Edward
Rafeedie acquitted Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain for lack of evidence
against him.9 However, the damage to international law had already
been done.
The Alvarez-Machain decision not only damages the constitutional
guarantees protected by the Mexican Constitution1° and the sovereignty
of Mexico, but also opens the way for United States police departments
to enforce laws by violating the national sovereignty of other countries1
and the constitutional rights of those countries' citizens.
The world's reaction to the Alvarez-Machain decision suggests the
seriousness of this deviation from international law, 2 a deviation that
affects the whole community of nations. The President of the Nicara-
6. Id. at 2197.
7. Id. at 2193-95.
8. Id. at 2196.
9. Lou Cannon, U.S. Judge Acquits Mexican in DEA Agent's '85 Killing-Physician was
Abducted, Placed on Trial, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1992, at Al.
10. CONSTrrucI6N, arts. 14, 16 (Mex.).
11. Examples abound: In Texas, a Jefferson County District Attorney investigator and an
officer for the Port Arthur Police Department face a warrant order issued against them by a
Mexican Federal Judge in Piedras Negras, Coahuila, for the 1989 kidnapping of Mexican citi-
zens Omar Ayala and Hector Morales Villa. See Proceso Penal: 98-989, Delito: Privaci6n
Ilegal de la Libertad y otros, Procesado: Federico Rivera Balderas y otros, Juzgado Tercero de
Distrito en el Estado de Coahuila (copy on file with the Hastings Constitutional Law Quar-
terly).
Also in Texas, the court of appeals in El Paso held that the "isolated, spontaneous, illegal
seizureol" of Sylvia Day in Mexico by members of the FBI without resort to judicial process or
international extradition treaty procedure would not support challenge to personal jurisdic-
tion, absent abuse or treatment shocking to the conscience. Day v. Texas, 763 S.W.2d 535, 536
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988); see Quintero v. Texas, 761 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
A United States Border Patrol agent and a deputy from the sheriff's department in
Cochise, Arizona have been implicated in the June, 1992 kidnapping of Mexican citizen Teo-
doro Romulo Lopez. The Mexican federal attorney's office is formulating criminal charges
against the officers. Gregory Katz, Mexico Demands Extradition of Two US. Law Officers,
Hous. CHRON., June 19, 1992, at A23.
12. See Brief for the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent
in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (No. 91-712), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 9119 (1992). Canada held similar views to those of Mexico and presented the results of
a ten-country poll that reflected unanimous disapproval of international abduction practices.
Id. at 6. This document was published by the Mexican Foreign Ministry. See Secretari de
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guan Permanent Commission for Human Rights (CPDH) said the ruling
allows the United States government to "solve a crime with a crime." 13
Central American nations are now skeptical and distrustful of any possi-
ble future agreements with the United States.14 Costa Rican deputies
have said the ruling could present a dangerous "boomerang" to the
United States since other countries may now allow kidnapping of United
States nationals in the United States or abroad.' 5 The President of the
Salvadoran Supreme Court stated that the court would not tolerate ab-
ductions of fellow nationals under any circumstances, adding that the
armed forces would protect Salvadorans threatened by such action. 6
Keith Knight, Jamaica's National Security Minister, stated that any
North American caught in the act of kidnapping a Jamaican citizen
would have to face the brunt of local legislation.' 7 Barbados and St. Lu-
cia have also spoken out against the decision. Senator Mary Francis of
St. Lucia said, "America is going crazy, it is replacing a sense of justice
with a sense of 'might is right.' "18 Argentine Foreign Minister Guido di
Tella said that his country would punish anyone attempting to kidnap a
fellow national.' 9 The Bolivian vice president called the decision a clear
violation of international law and an "illogical and unilateral" measure.20
The Brazilian Foreign Minister condemned the United States decision as
contrary to the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter, 1 which
prohibits intervention in the domestic affairs of foreign nations.22 He ad-
ded that the violation of Mexican territorial sovereignty "appears clear"
Relaciones Exteriores, Limits to National Jurisdiction: Documents and Judicial Resolutions on
the Alvarez-Machain Case, Mexico, 1992.
For a specific case of abuse against the sovereignty of Canada, see Jaffe v. Boyles, 616 F.
Supp. 1371 (C.D.N.Y. 1985). Sidney Jaffe was abducted from his Toronto home in 1981 and
taken to Florida to stand trial for violating Florida law. Id. See also Jaffe v. Dearing, 1991
Ont. C. J. LEXIS 1602.
13. Supreme Court Ruling Clouds U.S.-Central American Relations, Notimex, Mexican
News Service, June 18, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL File.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Latin American Nations Fight US. Supreme Court Decision, Notimex, Mexican News
Service, June 18, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL File.
17. Caribbean: Region Angry at U.S. Supreme Court Ruling, Inter Press Service, June 18,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRES File.
18. Id.
19. Latin American Nations Fight U.S. Supreme Court Decision, supra note 16.
20. Reaction to U.S. Supreme Court Decision Endorsing Right to Kidnap Foreigners for
Prosecution in US., NotiSur-S. Am. Pol. Affairs, June 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, INTL File.
21. Charter of the Organization of American States, opened for signature, Apr. 30, 1948, 2
U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter OAS Charter], amended by Protocol of Buenos
Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607.
22. Id. art. 20 (prohibiting the use of force by a foreign power).
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in the Alvarez-Machain case.23 The decision was also condemned by
Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Uruguay, and Venezuela.24
Outside the hemisphere, the Arab countries also condemned the de-
cision. An editorial from a mass circulation newspaper in Egypt said,
"We doubt that those who issued this ruling are really men of the law or
have even studied the alphabet of the law."25 In Rabat, a newspaper
called the Supreme Court ruling "an amalgamation of executive and judi-
cial powers" that "justifies... the kidnapping of heads of state... in the
Third World."26 The criticisms ring true-it is logical for many outside
the United States to view the Supreme Court's decision as an expression
of superpower geopolitics.
The Court's decision has attracted domestic critics as well. An edi-
torial from The Houston Chronicle called the Supreme Court decision a
"Pandora's Box," and added that disregarding the law is no way to pur-
sue justice.2 7 Unfortunately, the term "Pandora's Box" is apt. The deci-
sion not only invites other countries to perform their own abductions, it
appears to sanction federal, state, county, and city law officers' perform-
ance of abductions from any country in the world. Additionally, the de-
cision suggests that the United States executive branch may disregard not
only the United States' bilateral extradition treaties, but any kind of bi-
lateral treaty. The Los Angeles Times called Alvarez-Machain "a pyrrhic
victory" for the United States, a tool of extremely dubious value that
could backfire.28 "If we can snatch anyone we want, whenever we want,
wherever we want, why bother with legal niceties at all?"29
An even more pessimistic argument is that the Supreme Court is
just lifting the barriers that protect human rights and tilting the balance
of law in favor of law enforcement officers. An unspoken policy differen-
tiates on the basis of nationality, and the civil rights of foreigners are not
weighed heavily when the unrestricted power of the American executive
branch, including the law enforcement officer, is on the other side of the
23. Reaction to U.S. Supreme Court Decision Endorsing Right to Kidnap Foreigners for
Prosecution in U.S., supra note 20.
24. Id.
25. Egyptian Press Attacks U.S. Kidnap Ruling, Reuter Library Report, June 18, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File.
26. Id.
27. Pandora's Box, supra note 4, at A18.
28. Jeopardizing Relations with Mexico: High court ruling justifies dangerous 'snatch'
technique in notorious Camarena case, L.A. TIMES, Editorial, June 16, 1992, at B6.
29. Id. Compare this sentiment with Article I of the Mexican Constitution which pro-
tects the rights of foreigners and Mexican nationals equally. See CONsTrruci6N art. 1 (Mex.);
see also infra, note 48.
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legal equation.3 °
This Article explores a wide spectrum of issues which spring from
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Alvarez-Machain. Part I
addresses kidnapping within the context of human rights policy, interna-
tional law, and national sovereignty.
Part II analyzes the law of treaties, focusing on bilateral extradition
treaties and court decisions in this field, including those by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, the judicial arm of the United Nations. An im-
proper interpretation of a bilateral extradition treaty affects not only the
treaty with Mexico, but any treaty with other countries. This part exam-
ines the United States' intentions in signing its treaties.
Part III discusses how international kidnapping affects the commu-
nity of nations as a whole. The analysis focuses on customary and con-
ventional international law as the "Supreme Law of the Land" under the
United States Constitution. 1
Part IV examines Alvarez-Machain in the context of the preceding
analyses and critiques the Court's legal reasoning as well as its politi-
cally-motivated decision-making.
Part V considers an array of remedies, suggesting that solutions
should be explored before the United Nations and the Organization of
American States. This Article mentions that, in addition to exploring
other viable remedies, Congress should expressly prohibit international
kidnapping and similar violations of international law.
I. Kidnapping, Human Rights, and International Law
That no government may use force in the territory of another sover-
eign state is a well-established and revered principle. It is as old as the
concept of sovereignty and finds its modern expression in the Charter of
the United Nations.32 Most modern governments have come to agree
that states must conduct their foreign affairs according to international
law. The contrary would lead to chaos and the domination of force over
reason and justice.
Pursuant to international law, neither the United States nor Mexico
can use force in the territory of another country. The United Nations
Charter describes alternative paths for nations to resolve their interna-
30. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264-66 (1990). In Verdugo-
Urquidez, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment's protection does not apply to
foreigners who have not developed a sufficient connection with the United States so as to be
considered part of the American community. Id
31. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
32. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 2, 4.
Summer 1993] MONSTROUS DECISION: KIDNAPPING IS LEGAL 839
tional conflicts. 33 The alternatives must be exhausted before a nation
may resort to the use of force against another country.34 An expression
of this idea was recently drafted into the United Nations Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs, which came into force on No-
vember 11, 1990.31 The Convention states that a party "shall not under-
take in the territory of another Party the exercise of jurisdiction and
performance of functions which are exclusively reserved for the authori-
ties of that other Party by its domestic law.' 36 The language was intro-
duced by delegates from Canada and Mexico37 and reflects an enduring
commitment to international law despite domestic pressures to expedite
the war on drugs. The temptation to expedite social policy by side-step-
ping international law is not new. In 1968, Professor M. Cherif Bas-
siouni stated:
The most serious threat to world public order lies in the practice of
unlawful seizure of a person in a foreign state and his abduction.
The Eichmann and Tschombe cases will remain landmarks of such
abusive practice. The abduction or kidnapping is a transgression
against the sovereignty of the state wherein the fugitive was taken
by agents of another state. It is an affront of the asylum state and a
challenge to the lawfulness of orderly world relations. Not to men-
tion the individual's human rights. 38
The costs to the integrity of international relations and human rights are
too great to justify such means.
The Mexican Federal Constitution does not allow foreign police of-
ficers to arrest or punish offenders in Mexican territory. 39 Very specifi-
cally, it states, as an individual guarantee, that only the Mexican Public
33. U.N. CHARTER art. 33.
34. Id.
35. U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances, U.N. Doe. E/Conf. 82/15 (1988), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989) [hereinafter U.N.
Convention].
36. Id. art. 2, § 3.
37. Ruth Wedgwood, Cross-Border Kidnap Banned by U.N. Treaty, WALL ST. J., July 23,
1992, at A13.
38. M. CherifBassiouni, International Extradition in American Practice and World Public
Order, 36 TENN. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1968) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Interna-
tional Extradition].
39. CONSTrrUCI6N arts. 1-26 (Mex.) (individual guarantees). The Mexican Constitution,
as well as other Mexican laws, are binding on everyone in Mexico. Foreigners, including offi-
cials from other countries, are not excluded from obeying Mexican laws. When American
citizens step onto Mexican soil they are expected to respect Mexican law. See REsTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 441(l)(a) (1987) [hereinaf-
ter RESTATEMENT]. Additionally, the extradition treaty between the United States and Mex-
ico states that the procedure of extradition is subordinated to the laws of the requested state.
See Extradition Treaty, supra note 2, art. 13, 31 U.S.T. at 5069 (recognizing the binding nature
of the Mexican constitutional guarantees).
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Ministry (an institution comprising lawyers of the General Attorney's
office) with the help of the Judicial Police can prosecute crime in
Mexico.'
Every country needs cooperation in the fight against crime. There
must be a legal instrument to prevent suspects from escaping justice by
crossing a border. At the same time, such an instrument must honor the
rights of the individual by submitting to the country's due process where
the suspect is found.
Under the Mexican Constitution, no one can be deprived of life,
freedom, or property except by a judicial hearing which honors the essen-
tial requirements of judicial process. 41 This means that everyone who is
arrested in Mexico has the right to a lawyer, to obtain a hearing before a
judge, and to challenge the arrest or the legal procedure against him
before a Mexican tribunal.
Extradition is a mechanism that allows the prosecution of a crime-
even when the suspect escapes to another country-without jeopardizing
the human rights of the citizens of that neighboring country. The extra-
dition procedure protects the individual rights of the extraditable person
because it always requires a hearing before a judge of the requested
nation.
To initiate the application for extradition to the United States, the
following procedure is observed: An application for extradition must be
presented to the United States Secretary of State. If the alleged offense is
within the jurisdiction of a state, the application passes from the gover-
nor of that state to the Secretary of State. If the offense is against the law
of the United States, the request passes from the Attorney General of the
United States to the Secretary of State.4" Soon after that, the Secretary of
State, who is in charge of foreign affairs, transmits the petition to the
requested country through a diplomatic letter.
The Bilateral Extradition Treaty between the United States and
Mexico states that a request for extradition shall be processed in accord-
ance with the laws of the requested party.4" When the United States
Secretary of State then makes a request for extradition from Mexico,
Mexican law specifies the procedures to be followed. According to the
40. "In the United Mexican States all individuals shall enjoy the guarantees granted by
this Constitution, they can not be restricted or suspended but in the cases and according to the
conditions described by this Constitution itself." CONsTiTucI6N art. 21 (Mex.) (translation by
author). See Extradition Treaty, supra note 2, art. 13, 31 U.S.T. at 5069.
41. CONSTITUCI6N art. 14 (Mex.).
42. See Bassiouni, International Extradition, supra note 38, at 6.
43. Extradition Treaty, supra note 2, art. 13, 31 U.S.T. at 5069.
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Mexican Extradition Act,' the petition for extradition must be presented
to the Mexican Foreign Ministry, which will, in turn, ask the General
Attorney's Office to request a warrant order from the District judge.45
The bilateral extradition treaty instructs that the competent legal author-
ities of the requested party shall employ all legal means within their
power to obtain from the judicial authorities the decisions necessary for
the resolution of the request for extradition.46 The Mexican Constitution
states that no treaty can be enacted that "adversely affects the guarantees
and rights granted by the Constitution for man and Citizen."'47 Indeed,
the Mexican Constitution establishes that every individual, including for-
eigners, will enjoy the guarantees provided by its chapter on individual
rights.
48
The main objection to a "quick surrender," or transfer of an individ-
ual between governments without due process under the requested na-
tion's constitution, is that such an "under-the-table" transaction reflects
a lack of respect for human rights. Kidnapping"9 a suspect is even more
repugnant than a "quick surrender." Professor Bassiouni refers to illegal
seizures as "illegal acts.., which cause damage to the person or property
of the nationals of a foreign State."50 He adds that this practice violates
44. Ley de Extradici6n International (D.O., Dec. 29, 1975) (Mex.) [hereinafter Interna-
tional Extradition Act].
45. Id. arts. 21, 24, 25.
46. Id.
47. CoNs-rruci6N art. 15 (Mex.).
48. On this point the Mexican Constitution goes further than its United States counter-
part in that the Mexican Constitution cannot be interpreted so that its constitutional rights are
reserved for Mexican citizens and not foreigners. See CoNsTITucI6N, art. 1 (Mex.).
49. For a definition of the crime of kidnapping in Mexico, see the chapter on deprivation
of liberty and other guarantees in the Mexican Federal Penal Code. C.P.D.F. arts. 364-366
(Mex.). See Villareal v. Hammond, 74 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir. 1934). In Villareal, American
bounty hunters pursued Lopez, an escaped bond defaulter, into Mexico where they effected his
forcible seizure and delivered him to waiting authorities in Texas. The court stated:
[T]he fact that the government of Mexico has no doubt that it [constituted a kidnap-
ping], coupled with the further fact that what appellants did is generally and univer-
sally regarded under the laws of civilized nations as kidnapping, would cause the
doubt to be resolved in favor of the demanding nation. But resort to construction is
not necessary here, for it may not be doubted that the evidence was fully sufficient to
sustain the charge under the treaty provision, under the statutes of Mexico and under
those of Texas. Appellants did not do what they insist over and over again would not
have been an offense, arrest Lopez in Mexico for delivery to the lawfully constituted
Mexican authorities. They did not arrest him at all. In violation of the sovereignty
of the state where he had sought asylum, they seized him unlawfully, and with force
and arms took him unlawfully out of that state and into another to dispose of him at
their will and pleasure to obtain a reward.
Id. at 505-06 (citations omitted).
50. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures and Irregular Rendition Devices as Alterna-
tives to Extradition, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 25,48 (1973) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Unlawful
Seizures].
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the protection of human rights referred to in the United Nations Charter,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights."l As Bassiouni notes:
The processes of extradition involve the requested and requesting
states, but there are two additional participants whose interests
must be considered: the individual and the world community. For
the first participant, certain minimum human rights must be pro-
tected; for the second, minimum world order must be preserved. 2
Additionally, under the Charter of the United Nations, members shall
fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with
the Charter. 3 All U.N. members shall refrain from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations.54
The United Nations Security Council, in reference to the abduction
of Adolf Eichmann from Argentina to the territory of Israel, stated that
"the violation of the sovereignty of a Member State is incompatible with
the Charter of the United Nations."55 The resolution noted that "the
repetition of acts such as that giving rise to this situation would involve a
breach of the principles upon which international order is founded, creat-
ing an atmosphere of insecurity and distrust incompatible with the pres-
ervation of peace."56 The resolution requested the government of Israel
to make appropriate reparation in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations and the rules of international law.5
In United States v. Toscanino,58 the Second Circuit stated that the
United States had agreed in two international treaties to respect the sov-
ereignty of the country where the abduction took place. 59 Those treaty
provisions are article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, and article 17
51. The United Nations Charter refers to respect for human rights in several articles. See
U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 13, 55, 56, 62, 76. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights
G.A. Res. 217A(III) U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., arts. 9, 10, 12, U.N. Doc. A/8810 (1948) (disap-
proving arbitrary arrest or detention and endorsing right to fair trial and public hearing);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, arts. 9, 14, 17, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (same).
52. Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures, supra note 50, at 25.
53. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 2.
54. Id. para. 4.
55. See S.C. Res. 138, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 865th Mtg., U.N. Doc S/4349 (1960). The
United States voted affirmatively on this resolution.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). Toscanino, an Italian citizen, claimed he was abducted
from his home in Uruguay by United States agents, tortured, and brought to the United States
to face narcotics charges. Id. at 268-271.
59. Id. at 277.
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of the Charter of the Organization of American States.' The Toscanino
court also noted that:
[The courts] must be guided by the underlying principle that the
government should be denied the right to exploit its own illegal
conduct and when an accused is kidnapped and forcibly brought
within the jurisdiction, the court's acquisition of power over his
person represents the fruits of the government's exploitation of its
own misconduct.61
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law states that United States
law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the territory of
another sovereign state only with the consent of that state and in compli-
ance with the laws both of the United States and of that country.62 The
Restatement adds that the acts and omissions of United States officials
are subject to the constraints of the United States Constitution whether
they are committed in the United States or abroad. 63 The United States
Constitution recognizes both customary and conventional international
law as the Supreme Law of the Land.6" Thus, an executive policy which
does not recognize the rules of international law is an unconstitutional
policy.
The Restatement describes a number of cases where offenders (kid-
nappers or other law-breakers) were punished by the state whose terri-
tory was violated.65 In 1973, an Italian inspector was arrested in
Switzerland for making inquiries about movement of contraband toward
Italy. 66 Another Italian policeman was prosecuted in France when he
drew his gun and wounded a suspect.67 Two French customs officials
were convicted of committing prohibited acts in favor of a foreign state
when they traveled to Switzerland on several occasions in 1980 to inter-
rogate a former official of a Swiss bank.68 Finally, in the nineteenth cen-
60. Id.
61. Id. at 275.
62. RESTATEMENT, supra note 39, § 433(1). Even though § 433(2) of the Restatement
mentions that a person apprehended in a foreign state may be prosecuted in the United States
unless his detention was carried out in a manner shocking to the conscience of civilized society,
this clause needs to be interpreted in light of § 433(1) and other dispositions of the
Restatement.
63. Id., § 433 cmt. a.
64. See discussion infra Part III; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8, and § 3; id. art.
III, § 2; id. art. VI, cl. 2; id. amend. IX; Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1101 (C.C.D.Pa.
1793); THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (John Jay); RESTATEMENT, supra note 39, § 111 cmt. e; Jor-
dan J. Paust, Customary International Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law of the
United States, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 59, 77-78, 84-87 (1990).
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tury Koszta affair, the United States Secretary of State determined that
Austrian functionaries had obtained possession of the person of Koszta,
not in a legal manner, but by violating the civil laws of Turkey.69
As demonstrated by the above cases, no state is allowed to use force
in foreign countries unless stringent requirements are fulfilled. Neither
the United States nor Mexico can surrender suspects to foreign authori-
ties unless that individual's constitutional rights are protected. 0 The de-
fendant must have an opportunity to challenge the arrest in the country
where it takes place, according to the constitutional guarantees that exist
in that territory.71 Moreover, no arrest or agreement may be made in
violation of the arrested individual's fundamental human rights.72 As a
result of these requirements, no state is allowed to kidnap suspects from
other countries.
Mexico can extradite suspects requested in accordance with its In-
ternational Extradition Act or an extradition treaty. In both cases, the
fundamental rights of the suspects are protected because the defendant is
able to challenge the detention before a Mexican court.7 3 International
law, which is part of the legal systems of both Mexico and the United
69. See Letter from W.L. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hiilsemann (Sep. 26, 1853), in 2
FRANCIS WHARTON, A DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 483-
86 (1886). Koszta was a Turkish born man who later became a U.S. citizen. He was abducted
by Austrian officers in Turkish waters without Turkish consent and, thus, in violation of inter-
national law. The U.S. sent a Diplomatic Letter to Austria complaining of that violation. See
id.
70. The Restatement only authorizes law enforcement in other states when it is done in
compliance with other state's laws. Obviously, constitutional guarantees need to be respected,
including the right to a court hearing when threatened with a deprivation of liberty. See RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 39, § 433(1)(a)-(b).
71. Id See CONsTIrcI6N arts. 1-24 (Mex.) (individual guarantees).
72. In 1981, the U.N. Human Rights Committee decided that the abduction of an Uru-
guayan refugee from Argentina by Uruguayan security officers constituted arbitrary arrest and
detention in violation of Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 39, § 432 n.1 (citing Report of the Human Rights
Committee, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 176-84, 185-89, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981)).
73. See International Extradition Act arts. 24-26 (D.O., Dec. 29, 1975) (Mex.). The Act
provides that the detainee shall appear before the District Court and be allowed to file objec-
tions to the detention on his own or by his lawyer. The detainee must be informed of the
reason for the arrest, must have a state-appointed lawyer when unable to pay for his own
defense, and, in some cases, be freed on bond. When the detention takes place under an extra-
dition treaty, the instrument must provide for the respect of the constitutional guarantees, or
the treaty is invalid. Id.; see CoNSTrucI6N art. 15 (Mex.).
The Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico provides that the requests
for extradition are processed in accordance with the laws of the requested country. The re-
quested country makes arrangements necessary for internal procedures arising out of the re-
quest for extradition. Competent authorities are authorized to employ all legal means within
their power to obtain from the judicial authorities decisions necessary for the resolution of the
extradition request. Extradition Treaty, supra note 2, art. 13, 31 U.S.T. at 5069.
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States, forbids violations of human rights and guarantees a court hearing
in the country where the person is arrested.74
Respect for the constitutional rights of a detainee within its territory
exists under the United States Constitution.71 The United States Extra-
dition Statute, however, confers the power to extradite only during the
existence of an extradition treaty with a foreign government. 76 Indeed,
the United States Supreme Court has said that the president's power, in
the absence of a statute conferring an independent power, must be found
in the terms of the treaty. 7 The United States has long recognized the
need to operate through extradition treaties as the legal way of interna-
tional cooperation against crime. As a result, there have been about 100
bilateral extradition treaties ratified by the United States. 78
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the international
law principle that a demand for extradition need not be granted unless it
conforms to the formalities and conditions prescribed in the treaties, in-
ternal legislation, and constitutional guarantees of the asylum nation. In
Factor v. Laubenheimer,79 the Supreme Court stated,
[T]he principles of international law recognize no right to extradi-
tion apart from treaty. While a government may, if agreeable to its
own Constitution and laws, voluntarily exercise the power to sur-
render a fugitive from justice to the country from which he has
fled, and it has been said that it is under a moral duty to do so ....
the legal right to demand his extradition and the correlative duty
to surrender him to the demanding country exist only when cre-
ated by treaty.80
74. See sources cited supra note 51.
75. Unfortunately, some authors seem to support the position that executive authority
may violate international law, including international human rights. For an article concerning
claims of executive immunity from law and trends in judicial decisions, see Jordan J. Paust, Is
the President Bound by the Supreme Law of the Land?-Foreign Affairs and National Security
Reexamined, 9 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 719 (1982) [hereinafter Paust, Is the President Bound].
76. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1988).
77. See Valentine v. United States ex reL Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 18 (1936).
78. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1992
(1992) [hereinafter TREATIES IN FORCE].
79. 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
80. Id. at 287 (citations omitted, emphasis added). After a petition of the British Consul,
a U.S. Commissioner held Mr. Factor in custody for extradition to England. Mr. Factor, an
English citizen, was charged with receiving money fraudulently obtained in London. How-
ever, those acts were not considered crimes in the state of Illinois where he was arrested. He
filed for habeas corpus relief on the basis that one requirement of the extradition treaty was not
met and therefore England did not have the right to demand his extradition. The Supreme
Court admitted that the legal right to demand his extradition and the correlative duty to sur-
render him exists only when created by treaty. However, the Court decided that the treaty was
applicable in this case. Id. at 304.
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Based on this language and the overwhelming force of international law
and tradition, it appears that the only valid means for moving a defend-
ant from a foreign nation into the United States is under the authority of
a mutual extradition treaty and after satisfying the constitutional rights
of the requested nation as well as the human rights guaranteed by inter-
national law.
II. Bilateral Extradition Treaties and the Law of Treaties
The United States can extradite suspects from its territory only
when there is an extradition treaty."' Mexico can extradite from its terri-
tory on the basis of an extradition treaty or in accordance with its Inter-
national Extradition Act.82 In all cases, however, the constitutional
guarantees and other human rights, granted by the constitution of the
asylum state and international instruments 3 should be respected.
In the bilateral relationship between the United States and Mexico,
there is a single extradition treaty.84 There is therefore no other way to
obtain custody of a suspect who is physically in the other country with-
out violating that individual's human rights, customary international
law, and the law of the treaties.
To arrive at this conclusion, one must look at how treaties are inter-
preted. This Part first examines some general principles of the law of
treaties and bilateral extradition treaties.
The federal judiciary "has the prerogative of interpreting and apply-
ing treaties and federal legislative enactments in accordance with the ap-
plicable provisions of the United States Constitution."85 Professor
Bassiouni, after considering several case precedents, summarizes the
rules of treaty interpretation as follows:
1. The purpose of treaty interpretation is to ascertain the plain
meaning of the language that comports with the parties' intentions.
2. Sources of evidence which indicate this are:
a. Negotiating history
b. Interpretation of the parties
c. Subsequent conduct of the parties
3. These sources are then construed according to the following
criteria:
a. Consistent interpretation of the terms
81. See Valentine, 299 U.S. at 9.
82. International Extradition Act art. 1 (D.O., Dec. 29, 1975) (Mex.).
83. See supra notes 51, 73 and accompanying text. See also CONsTITucI6N arts. 14, 16
(Mex.).
84. Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059.
85. M. CHERIF BAssIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE 39 (1987).
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b. Liberal construction of terms
c. Rule of liberality
d. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
e. Ejus dem generis
f. Retroactive application
g. International law principles regarding treaty
interpretation. 6
The Restatement describes the general rules of interpretation as follows:
(1) An international agreement shall be interpreted in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the agreement in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.
(2) The context for the purpose of interpretation shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the international agreement
which was made between all the parties in connection with the
conclusion of the agreement;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in
connection with the conclusion of the agreement and accepted
by the other parties as an instrument related to the agreement.
(3) There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding
the interpretation of the agreement or the application of its
provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the agree-
ment which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding
its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relation between the parties.8 7
The text of the Restatement is based on the rules of interpretation of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 8 Both the Extradition
Treaty and the United States-Canada Treaty on Extradition 9 need to be
interpreted in light of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs, which states that "a Party shall not undertake
in the territory of another Party the exercise of jurisdiction and perform-
ance of functions which are exclusively reserved for the authorities of
that other Party by its domestic law."9 Obviously, arresting a suspect
on Canadian or Mexican soil is a function reserved exclusively for the
authorities of those countries according to their respective constitutions.
86. Id. at 77.
87. RESTATEMENT, supra note 39, § 329.
88. Id The United States considers these provisions to reflect customary international
law. See ARTHUR W. ROVINE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1973 307, 482-83 (1974).
89. Treaty on Extradition, Dec. 26, 1971, U.S.-Can., 27 U.S.T. 983.
90. U.N. Convention, supra note 35, art. 2(3).
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The need to interpret international treaties in light of international law
was recognized in earlier times by United States Chief Justice John Jay:
Whenever doubts and questions arise relative to the validity, opera-
tion or construction of treaties, or of any articles in them, those
doubts and questions must be settled according to the maxims and
principles of the laws of nations applicable to the case. The peace,
prosperity, and reputation of the United States, will always greatly
depend on their fidelity to their engagements .... 91
The Vienna Convention reaffirms the customary maxims and princi-
ples of international law reflected also in the United Nations Charter:
the sovereign equality of all states, the prohibition of the threat or use of
force, and universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms.92
The Convention recognizes the "importance of treaties as a source
of international law and as instruments for developing peaceful coopera-
tion among nations, whatever their constitutional and social systems."93
Essentially, the principles of free consent, good faith and the rule ofpacta
sunt servanda94 are the main tools for interpreting international trea-
ties.95 As a United States scholar of international law affirms:
Although not yet acted upon in the Senate of the United States
... the Vienna Convention is the best evidence of what present
customary international law about treaties and other international
agreements is, at least with respect to most of its provisions. The
Department of State has stated since 1973 that it considers the con-
vention as a codification of customary international law and thus
as authoritative with respect to the executive's treatment of inter-
national agreements issues arising after May 22, 1969.96
The Vienna Convention codified preexisting principles of customary
international law. Some of those principles had been expressed by the
United States Supreme Court in Ross v. McIntyre.97 Relating to treaties
conflicting withjus cogens, the Vienna Convention states in Article 53:98
91. Henfield's Case, 11 F.Cas. 1099, 1101 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (Chief Justice Jay
giving charge to the grand jury). Jay's use of the expression "laws of nations" refers to cus-
tomary international law. See The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 371 (1824).
92. See Vienna Convention, supra note 3, prologue.
93. Id.
94. Id. The term "pacta sunt servanda" means agreements and stipulations of the parties
to a contract must be observed. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1109 (6th ed. 1990).
95. Vienna Convention; supra note 3, prologue.
96. JOSEPH M. SWEENEY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM 993-94 (3d ed. 1988).
97. Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453, 475 (1891).
98. "Jus cogens" refers to peremptory norms of general international law. See RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 39, § 102 cmt. k.
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A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of
the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general interna-
tional law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no deroga-
tion is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character.99
It adds, "every treaty is binding upon the parties to it and must be per-
formed by them in good faith."" °  Thus, if there is a question about the
extent of that binding relationship among the parties, they must look in
good faith to the goals of their treaty. Indeed, in order to find the pur-
poses of a treaty, the parties must analyze not only the whole instrument,
but also consider it as a part of the totality of instruments and rules of
international law related to the subject matter, pursuant to the principles
ofjus cogens.
There may be some questions about which international law rules
should be considered by the community of nations as part of the jus
cogens. There is no question, however, that the doctrines listed in the
purposes of the Charter of the United Nations are significant. These in-
clude the principles of sovereign equality, the respect for human
rights,' 0 1 fulfillment in good faith of the obligations assumed, peaceful
settlement of disputes, and refraining from the threat or use of force in
any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter. 102 The
United Nations Charter underscores the superiority of its rules in Article
52, which subordinates regional arrangements to settled principles of in-
ternational law. 103
Looking to the context of a treaty, not just relying on a literal inter-
pretation of its words, is the best way to provide coherence to a treaty's
provisions. The interpreter must consider its interrelation with other in-
ternational instruments and with international law. In order to under-
stand the purpose of a treaty, it is necessary to determine why the
instrument was signed and what was expected to be obtained by it. Fi-
nally, an interpretation producing legal effects, in accordance with the
99. Vienna Convention, supra note 3, art. 53. Therefore, no bilateral treaty can derogate a
jus cogens norm. A subsequentjus cogens rule, however, would derogate any bilateral treaty
that is contrary to its content.
100. See id. art. 26.
101. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 39, § 702 cmt. n.
102. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 2.
103. Id. art. 52. Furthermore, treaties need to be interpreted in accordance with Article
103 of the United Nations Charter, which states: "In the event of a conflict between the obliga-
tions of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall
prevail." Id. art. 103.
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rules ofjus cogens, must be preferred to one that could lead to results in
conflict with those peremptory norm, or in dubio pro jus cogens. °
It is reasonable to expect that the United States, at the signing of its
bilateral treaties and other international agreements on extradition, had a
good faith interest in abiding by their provisions and carrying out their
manifest purposes. There is no indication that the United States was
secretly attempting to reserve authority to disregard those provisions.' 05
Despite these initial intentions, several years after signing various extra-
dition treaties, the United States Department of Justice disregarded inter-
national law and abducted suspects from other sovereign nations.10 6 In
so doing, the United States Department of Justice claimed authority to
unilaterally disregard both the content and intent of extradition treaties
as well as United Nations Charter prohibitions, human rights law, and
other fundamental international norms.107
In Wright v. Henkel,108 however, the United States Supreme Court
stated that "[t]reaties must receive a fair interpretation, according to the
intention of the contracting parties, and so as to carry out their manifest
purpose."10 9 The purpose of an extradition treaty is to define a formal
channel for requesting and delivering suspects from one country to an-
other without transgressing either's domestic legislation or international
law. If the treaty were interpreted to give one party the option to follow
the treaty's procedure or to ignore it, the object and purpose of the in-
strument would be at serious risk.
As the Supreme Court explained in Ross v. McIntyre,'11 "the par-
ties' intentions are clear only if the treaty's context and history are con-
sidered. Courts often look to the circumstances surrounding the treaty's
culmination in interpreting the relevant provisions of the treaty." 111 In
104. "In dubio pro jus.cogens" means that if there is a doubt about which interpretation is
preferred, the one that is in accordance with thejus cogens should be selected. It applies when
the terms of the treaties are not sufficiently clear and admit more than one interpretation.
105. For references to several incidents involving complaints made by the United States for
abductions committed in violation of its sovereignty, see 4 JOHN B. MOORE, A DIGEsT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 603 (1906).
106. See supra notes 11-20, 23-28, 37.
107. See Michael Wines, U.S. Cites Right to Seize Fugitives Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
1989, at A6 (citing the Justice Department's confidential memorandum of June 21, 1989,
which appeared in the New York Times). The 1989 memorandum cites the right to seize fugi-
tives abroad. With this classified document, the Department of Justice reversed a 1980 Presi-
dent Carter policy which stated that overseas arrests were tantamount to kidnapping unless
foreign governments gave their approval in advance.
108. 190 U.S. 40 (1903).
109. Id. at 57.
110. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
111. Id. at 475.
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the same line of thinking, the Supreme Court in Sullivan v. Kidd" 2
wrote:
Writers of authority agree that treaties are to be interpreted upon
the principles which govern the interpretation of contracts in writ-
ing between individuals, and are to be executed in the utmost good
faith, with a view to making effective the purposes of the high con-
tracting parties; that all parts of a treaty are to receive a reasonable
construction with a view to giving a fair operation to the whole.113
In contracts, "pure potestative conditions," conditions that depend
exclusively on the will of the debtor and destroy the efficacy of the juridi-
cal linkage,1" 4 will not be held valid. There would be no point to creating
a bilateral extradition treaty in which the parties were allowed to obtain
custody over a suspect in a foreign country either by following the treaty
procedures or by kidnapping, because the treaty provisions would de-
pend exclusively on the will of one of the parties. Indeed, in Henfield's
Case,"5 Chief Justice Jay stated that "[tjreaties between independent na-
tions, are contracts or bargains which derive all their force and obligation
from mutual consent and agreement; and consequently, when once fairly
made and properly concluded, cannot be altered or annulled by one of
the parties, without the consent and concurrence of the other.""' 6 Lassa
Oppenheim wrote on treaty interpretation in his book International Law:
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend some-
thing reasonable and something not inconsistent with generally
recognized principles of International Law, nor with previous
treaty obligations towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning
of a provision is ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be pre-
ferred to the unreasonable, the more reasonable to the less reason-
able, the consistent meaning to the meaning inconsistent with
generally recognized principles of International Law and with pre-
vious treaty obligations toward third States." 7
Parties presumably intend their treaties to accord with international law.
Thus, there is no need in any international treaty to prohibit conduct
against international or domestic law. Those acts are already proscribed
by preexisting norms.
Extradition treaties need not include clauses prohibiting kidnapping,
violations of other countries' sovereignty, or suppression of constitu-
112. 254 U.S. 433 (1920).
113. Ard. at 439.
114. 2 MANUEL BORJA-SORIANO, TEORfA GENERAL DE LAS OBLIGACIONES 27 (1974)
(translation by author).
115. 11 F.Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360).
116. Id. at 1101.
117. 1 LASSA F.L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 952-53 (Hersch
Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955).
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tional guarantees of legal due process. These actions are obvious viola-
tions of jus cogens, domestic criminal codes, domestic constitutional
laws, domestic and international human rights principles, other rules of
customary international law, and of the Charters of the United Nations
and of the Organization of American States. Also, under Article 103 of
the United Nations Charter, any treaty (and thus, treaty interpretation)
inconsistent with the Charter does not prevail.118
There is no express prohibition of abduction in any of the more than
one hundred extradition treaties between the United States 1 9 and other
nations, including France,12 ° Germany, 121 Italy,122 Japan, 123 and the
United Kingdom. 124 Only a bad faith interpretation, made contrary to
several fundamental rules of international law, could argue that kidnap-
ping a suspect is permitted because it is not expressly prohibited by a
bilateral treaty. When a general rule is not expressly inserted in the
treaty, the United States Supreme Court has stated that the rule may be
implied from the "manifest scope and object of the treaty."' 12
The International Court of Justice regularly interprets obligations
arising from international treaties. Though the United States has with-
drawn from the Court's general compulsory jurisdiction, the decisions of
the International Court are expressions of customary international law.
In a case concerning military activities in and against Nicaragua, 126 the
court made clear the need to approach the controversy in light of cus-
tomary international law:
118. U.N. CHARTER art. 103. See S.C. Res. 138, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 865th Mtg.,
U.N. Doe S/4349 (1960) (U.N. Security Council condemning resolution related to a case of
international abduction). See also supra note 103.
119. See supra note 78.
120. Extradition Treaty, Jan. 6, 1909, U.S.-Fr., 37 Stat. 1526, T.I.A.S. No. 872, amended
by Supplementary Extradition Convention, Feb. 12, 1970, U.S.-Fr., 22 U.S.T. 407, T.I.A.S.
No. 7075.
121. Extradition Treaty, June 20, 1978, U.S.-Ger., Protocol, 32 U.S.T. 885.
122. Extradition Treaty, Oct. 13, 1983, U.S.-Italy, T.I.A.S. No. 10837.
123. Treaty on Extradition, March 8, 1954, U.S.-Japan, 31 U.S.T. 892.
124. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227.
125. Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 317 (1907). See Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123,
127 (1928) ("where a treaty fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting the rights that
may be claimed under it and the other enlarging them, the more liberal construction is to be
preferred.").
126. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26).
After Nicaragua filed an application instituting proceedings against the U.S. with respect to its
military and paramilitary activities in Nicaragua, the United States withdrew from the juris-
diction of the International Court of Justice (ICY). Originally, the United States had argued
that the ICJ did not have jurisdiction over the case concerning the mining of Nicaraguan
waters in the 1980s, however, after the ICJ decided it had jurisdiction over the controversy, the
United States withdrew October 7, 1985. See, JOSEPH M. SWEENEY ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 57-65 (3d ed. 1988).
[Vol. 20:833
Summer 1993] MONSTROUS DECISION: KIDNAPPING IS LEGAL 853
Nicaragua invokes a number of principles of customary and gen-
eral international law that, according to the Application, have been
violated by the United States. The fact that the above-mentioned
principles, recognized as such, have been codified or embodied in
multilateral conventions does not mean that they cease to exist and
to apply as principles of customary law, even as regards countries
that are parties to such conventions. Principles such as those of
the non-use of force, non-intervention, respect for the indepen-
dence and territorial integrity of States, and the freedom of naviga-
tion, continue to be binding as part of customary international law,
despite the operation of provisions of conventional law in which
they have been incorporated.127
In many ways the extradition treaties give printed life to what already
exists in customary international law.128
Several customary international law principles can be corroborated
by reading the more than one hundred extradition treaties which are
binding upon the United States. Some examples are the universal rules
of extradition or prosecution, the political offense exception, double
criminality, the specialty doctrine, requests by diplomatic channels, and
respect for the legal procedure of the territorial state. All are included in
any extradition treaty.1 29 However, when those principles are not in-
cluded in extradition treaties, they still exist as rules of international cus-
tomary law. This explains how single clauses about extradition
contained in the Hague Convention' 30 and the Montreal Convention13 1
can be used as replacements for extradition treaties. The same applies to
the extradition clause contained in the Convention Against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs.132
In reference to American practice, Professor Bassiouni has propheti-
cally warned that "the process of securing jurisdiction over the person of
a fugitive can be by lawful means provided for in the law of extradition
and the applicable treaties, or by means which subvert the spirit of the
treaty, such as the frequent practice of disguised extradition, or
abduction."'' 33
127. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1984 I.C.J. at 73.
128. See, eg., Jordan J. Paust, Extradition and United States Prosecution of the Achille
Lauro Hostage-Takers: Navigating the Hazards, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 235, 238-39 n.9
(1987) [hereinafter Paust, Extradition].
129. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 39, §§ 476-477.
130. Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, art. 8, § 2,
22 U.S.T. 1641, 1646, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (Hague Convention).
131. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Avia-
tion, Sept. 23, 1971, art. 8, § 2, 24 U.S.T. 565, 571, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 (Montreal Convention).
132. U.N. Convention, supra note 35, 28 I.L.M. at 507-08.
133. Bassiouni, International Extradition, supra note 38, at 10. See generally Paul
O'Higgins, Disguised Extradition: The Soblen Case, 27 MOD. L. Rv. 521 (1964).
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III. International Law as the Supreme Law of the Land
International law, whether conventional or customary, is the
Supreme Law of the Land in the United States under the United States
Constitution. Though not codified or written, customary international
law, as incorporated by federal law, federal statutes, and international
treaties, is part of United States law. This position is supported by his-
torical practice, the Restatement, past Supreme Court decisions, and the
intent of the Framers.
In Roman Law, custom was defined as inveterate consuetudo, opinio
juris or consensus omnium, opinio necessitatis.3 4 Translated, the expres-
sions mean a repeated practice accepted by the community as
mandatory. They refer to the expectations of any civilized community.
In terms of the international community they mean that states, and in
general all humankind, expect to address international concerns and rela-
tions in accordance with universally accepted rules. The practice among
states, and their expectations of proceeding according to rules, have been
shaping customary international law through the centuries. "Born more
directly of real authority and strength, it [customary international law] is
likely to be more directly authoritative in particular social contexts." 35
Supreme Court cases have recognized customary international law
as the supreme law established by the general consent of mankind, 36 to
which the executive branch is subordinate, 37 and which controls in the
absence of congressional act or executive order, or even when there is an
earlier statute or executive act. 138
Unfortunately, some supporters of wider flexibility in the executive
branch object to the incorporation of customary international law into
American law, and argue that the President is not bound by international
134. See JUAN IGLESIAS, DERECHO ROMANO: INSTITUCIONES DE DERECHO PRIVADO 49
(Editorial Ariel, S.A., Barcelona 1985) (1958).
135. Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law
of the United States, 12 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 59, 62-63 (1990) (stating that international custom-
ary law rules are more authoritative than other rules, including domestic rules) [hereinafter
Paust, Customary International Law].
136. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 227 (1796) (Chase, J. opinion).
137. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178-79 (1804) (Marshall, C.J., opinion).
138. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). Paquete Habana has been
wrongly interpreted to state that international law is controlling only when there is not a con-
gressional act, executive order, or judicial expression. However, Paquete Habana contains no
expression limiting its application to those situations. Considering the expressions used in
Paquete Habana in light of earlier judicial decisions and the nature of customary international
law, there is no doubt that customary international law is the Supreme Law of the Land. It
has the nature of federal law since it involves the relations of the United States, foreign states,
citizens or subjects.
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law. Addressing the question of whether the President of the United
States may violate customary international law, Professor Jordan J.
Paust affirms that the President is bound by, and may not lawfully vio-
late, international law. He writes:
While a few academics (few indeed) and aspiring lawbreakers
within the executive branch have had the audacity publicly to disa-
gree, it is evident to a thorough reader that they either were unfa-
miliar with relevant language from several judicial opinions and
opinions of the attorneys general or had misinterpreted some of
that language. In view of the actual trends in legal decision and
the legal policies at stake, there is simply no viable counterargu-
ment.... The President must obey and faithfully execute supreme
federal law whether it is customary or treaty-based.139
The Restatement recognizes that:
[s]ince international customary law and an international agreement
have equal authority in international law, and both are law of the
United States, arguably later customary law should be given effect
as law of the United States, even in the face of an earlier law or
agreement, just as a later international agreement of the United
States is given effect in the face of an earlier law or agreement. 14 °
As long ago as 1797 the United States Attorney General stated, "the
common law has adopted the law of nations in its fullest extent, and
made it a part of the Law of the Land."'1 41 Specifically on the point of
violation of sovereign territorial rights, Attorney General Lee stated:
It is an offence against the laws of nations for any persons, whether
citizens or foreigners, inhabiting within the limits of the United
States, to go into the territory of Spain with intent to recover their
property by their own strength, or in any other manner than its
laws authorize and permit. 4
Professor Paust does not advocate restricting the strength of cus-
tomary international law to a mere extension of common law. "[I]t is too
simplistic to argue, that customary international law is incorporable
139. Jordan J. Paust, The President Is Bound by International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 377,
378 (1987) [hereinafter Paust, The President Is Bound].
140. RESTATEMENT, supra note 39, § 115 cmt. d. Although the Restatement suggests that
acts of Congress, provisions of treaties, and rules of customary international law all have the
same rank as the Supreme Law of the Land, it does not authoritatively state that customary
international law has sufficient authority to derogate earlier and opposing congressional acts.
This seems to be because the Supreme Court has not addressed this question.
There is no conclusive indication that the Supreme Court would make statutes or treaties
prevail over customary international law. A different question would be how to prove the
existence of a rule of customary international law. The difficulty, in some instances, of clearly
evidencing the existence of a rule of customary international law does not affect its validity, but
rather its formulation in domestic or international courts.
141. See 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 69 (1797).
142. Id
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merely as some sort of 'common law'."14 He suggests that customary
international law is not merely "common" law or "general" law, but
much more, and of a higher transnational status.
Either under the guise of federal common law or as customary inter-
national law itself, it is part of the Supreme Law of the Land in the
United States. The terms used in the United States Constitution were
not intended to restrict the meaning of the words "laws of the United
States"'" to federal statutes. Otherwise, the phrases "statutes of the
United States" or "Congressional statutes" would have sufficed. Indeed,
in Henfield's Case, 45 Justice Jay pointed out that "the Constitution, the
statutes of Congress, the laws of nations, and treaties constitutionally
made, compose the laws of the United States."' 46
The existence of the law of nations, which cannot have another
meaning than customary international law, was recognized in 1824 in
The Apollon:147
It would be monstrous to suppose that our revenue officers were
authorized to enter into foreign ports and territories, for the pur-
pose of seizing vessels which had offended against our laws. It can-
not be presumed that Congress would voluntarily justify such a
clear violation of the laws of nations. 148
The United States, through the Department of State and the execu-
tive branch, has expressly recognized customary international law, at
least in matters concerning the law of treaties 149 and the law of the sea.' 50
The official statements of the United States are not constitutional ele-
ments of customary international law; they are just evidence of its exist-
ence. There is no requirement of official recognition of other subjects of
customary international law, such as the ban on kidnapping.
The United States Constitution was designed not only in accordance
with the law of nations, but was also aimed at providing greater respect
for it. As John Jay expressed in The Federalist:
143. Paust, Customary International Law, supra note 135, at 78.
144. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2; id. art. IV, cl. 2.
145. 11 F.Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793).
146. Id. at 1101 (emphasis added).
147. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824).
148. Id. at 371 (emphasis added); see Paust, The President Is Bound, supra note 139, at
378.
149., The Department of State recognized the content of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties as an expression of customary international law. See ROVINE, supra note 88,
at 307, 482-83.
150. The presidency recognized the content of the Convention of the Law of the Sea as an
expression of customary international law. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 39, Part V, Intro-
ductory Note.
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The just causes of war, for the most part, arise either from
violations of treaties, or from direct violence. America has already
formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of
them, except Prussia, are maritime, and therefore able to annoy
and injure us. She has also extensive commerce with Portugal,
Spain, and Britain, and, with respect to the two latter, has, in addi-
tion, the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to.["']
It is of high importance to the peace of America that she ob-
serve the laws of nations towards all these powers .... "'
Precisely the need to honor customary international law motivated
John Jay to support federalism.
[U]nder the national government, treaties and articles of treaties,
as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one
sense and executed in the same manner; whereas, adjudications on
the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four
confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent .... 153
In conclusion, Jay wrote that given that "either designed or acciden-
tal violations of treaties and the laws of nations afford just causes of war,
they are less to be apprehended under one general government than
under several lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the
safety of the people."' 15 4
When federal authorities disdain the rules of international law by
committing international abductions, and swerve from proceeding on
good faith and justice in the interpretation of bilateral extradition trea-
ties, their actions are not only repugnant to the philosophy of the Consti-
tution, but become an illegitimate example for local authorities. Actions
that violate customary international law violate United States law, under
the Constitution.
IV. The Alvarez-Machain Case
A. The Opinion of the Court
The facts of the case United States v. Alvarez-Machain were summa-
rized by the Reporter of Decisions as follows:
[Alvarez-Machain], a citizen and resident of Mexico, was forcibly
kidnapped from his home and flown by private plane to Texas,
where he was arrested for his participation in the kidnapping and
murder of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent and
the agent's pilot. After concluding that DEA agents were respon-
151. Since its independence in 1821, Mexico has taken the place of Spain as a neighbor
country of the United States.
152. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 21 (John Jay) (Tudor 1937).
153. Id.
154. Id.
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sible for the abduction, the District Court dismissed the indictment
on the ground that it violated the Extradition Treaty... and or-
dered respondent's repatriation. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Based on one of its prior decisions, the court found that, since the
United States had authorized the abduction and since the Mexican
government had protested the Treaty violation, jurisdiction was
improper. 155
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals,15 6 and held that Alvarez-Machain's forcible abduction did not pro-
hibit his trial in a United States court for violations of this country's
criminal laws.
15 7
The Supreme Court's analysis turned on three basic assertions.
First, a defendant may not be prosecuted in violation of the terms of an
extradition treaty. When a treaty has not been invoked, however, a court
may properly exercise jurisdiction even when the defendant's presence is
procured by means of a forcible abduction. Thus, if the Extradition
Treaty does not prohibit the defendant's abduction, the rule of Ker v.
Illinoisss applies and jurisdiction will be proper.'- 9
Second, neither the Extradition Treaty's language nor the history of
negotiations and practice under it supports the proposition that it prohib-
its abductions outside of its terms. The treaty says nothing about forcible
abduction or the consequences if an abduction occurs. Although the
Mexican government was made aware of the Ker doctrine as early as
1906, and language to curtail Ker was drafted as early as 1935, the
treaty's current version contains no such clause. 6°
Finally, general principles of international law provide no basis for
interpreting the treaty to include an implied term prohibiting interna-
tional abductions. While Alvarez-Machain may have been correct that
his abduction was shocking and in violation of general international law
principles, the decision whether he should be returned to Mexico, as a
matter outside the treaty, is a matter for the executive branch.1 61
B. Objections to the Opinion of the Court
In its apparent desire to support the actions of the executive branch,
the Supreme Court not only placed at risk the principle of separation of
powers, but also failed to apply the "supreme law of the land."
155. 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2189 (1992) (syllabus).
156. Id at 2197.
157. Id.
158. 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Ker is discussed infra notes 186-209 and accompanying text.
159. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2191-93.
160. Id. at 2191-95.
161. Id. at 2195-97.
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1. States Must Comply with Their Treaties
A defendant should not be prosecuted in violation of an extradition
treaty. A treaty does not apply solely when it is invoked. Under estab-
lished doctrines of international law,162 treaties apply whenever the facts
contemplated in their hypotheses take place. 163  It does not matter
whether or not it is formally invoked. The nature of bilateral extradition
treaties is to regulate the legal surrender of suspects between jurisdic-
tions. Any other kind of extraterritorial detention or transfer is contrary
to the treaty, against the principles of international law, and damaging to
individual human rights. 164
Treaty obligations, once assumed, cannot be disregarded. Any ac-
tion contrary to the intent of a treaty is illegal. The declarations in bilat-
eral or multilateral treaties establish a series of bilateral engagements
with other states, in which the clauses and the procedure of the treaty
must be considered.1 65 By signing bilateral extradition treaties, 6 6 the
United States assumes several obligations and causes other nations to
rely on the procedures described in those instruments.
In Alvarez-Machain, the United States officers acted without good
faith ab initio because they sought a suspect who, according to the Extra-
dition Treaty, could challenge the extradition on several grounds. Under
the United States-Mexico treaty, extradition may not be granted, even if
the Mexican government would agree to surrender the suspect, if it is
requested for an offense committed outside the territory of the requesting
party and the suspect is a national of the requested country. 16 7 Alvarez-
Machain was wanted for an offense committed in Mexico and he was a
Mexican national. In such a case, application of the treaty is to be deter-
mined by a Mexican federal court. His right to challenge his detention
before that court is a fundamental civil right the treaty was designed to
162. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88, 92-96.
163. This principle was recognized by the United States in 1881 in a letter from then Secre-
tary of State Blaine:
The treaty of extradition between the United States and Mexico prescribes the forms
for carrying it into effect, and does not authorize either party, for any cause, to devi-
ate from those forms, or arbitrarily abduct from the territory of one party a person
charged with crime for trial within the jurisdiction of the other.
Letter from James G. Blaine, Secretary of State, to the Governor of Texas (May 3, 1881),
reprinted in 4 MOORE, supra note 105, § 603.
164. See supra notes 70-74.
165. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, at 60-61
(Nov. 26).
166. There are more than 100 bilateral extradition treaties which are binding upon the
United States. See TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 78.
167. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 2, art. 1, § 2(b), 31 U.S.T. at 5062.
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protect.
16
The United States officers did more than just obtain an individual
whom they knew they might not have the authority to request; they did
something worse. Instead of directing their request for the suspect's ex-
tradition to the Mexican diplomatic authorities as required by the
treaty,16 9 they attempted to make extralegal arrangements with Mexican
police officers for his illegal surrender. 7 ' Ultimately the United States
officers resorted to kidnapping. 7 ' The Supreme Court of the United
States subsequently condoned this practice,' setting a terrible example
for other federal and local law enforcement agencies.
2. Kidnapping Is a Violation of the Extradition Treaty
Kidnapping is against the nature, purpose, and goals of the Extradi-
tion Treaty. Although fast and effective, kidnapping sidesteps the safe-
guards described in the Extradition Treaty to protect individual human
rights and asylum country sovereignty.
The Extradition Treaty contains numerous limitations on a State's
right to transfer an individual across borders. The logical implication is
that if these requirements are not satisfied, the suspect may not be re-
moved by the requesting country. For example, the principle of dual
criminality, which means that the offense should be considered a crime in
both countries in order to grant extradition,'73 would not make sense if
the requesting state had the option of following the treaty or ignoring it
and simply kidnapping suspects. The requirement that the punishment
must involve imprisonment for more than one year, and be restricted to
the list of crimes mentioned in the Appendix of the Treaty174 would be
meaningless if the requesting party had the alternative of simply not in-
yoking the treaty and performing an abduction. Indeed, it does not make
sense to impose the burden of proof on the requesting party to demon-
strate a crime was committed or the person has been convicted175 if the
requesting country can alternatively kidnap the suspect and meet no bur-
den of proof at all.
168. See CONsTrrucI6N arts. 14, 16 (Mex.); see also supra notes at 51, 73.
169. Actions of foreign policy belong to diplomatic authorities, and negotiations on inter-
national extraditions must be conducted by the United States State Department and the Mexi-
can Foreign Ministry (Secretarna de Relaciones Exteriores). See Extradition Treaty, supra note
2, art. 10, 31 U.S.T. at 5066-68.
170. See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 602-04 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
171. Id.
172. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2197 (1992).
173. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 2, art. 1, § 2(a), 31 U.S.T. at 5061.
174. Id. art. 2, 31 U.S.T. at 5062-63.
175. Id. art. 3, 31 U.S.T. at 5063.
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Like reasoning applies to the treaty's prohibition against extraditing
for political and military offenses. 17 6 This prohibition would be laugha-
ble if the requesting party had the authority to disregard the treaty and
simply abduct any politically offensive person. The treaty also states that
when prosecution has become barred by lapse of time according to the
laws of the requesting or requested country, extradition shall not be
granted.1 77 Another important safeguard of human rights insures that
an individual shall not be extradited when he has already been tried and
convicted or acquitted by the requested state on the same offense. 178 If
the individual is deprived of the opportunity to challenge petitions of
extradition before the courts of the requested country, and if the treaty is
not binding upon the requesting country, all procedural protections be-
come illusory.
A more drastic consequence of an Extradition Treaty violation ex-
ists in the potential disregard for the clause that prevents extradition to
impose capital punishment. 179 In 1989 in Texas, Jefferson County Dis-
trict Attorney investigators kidnapped two Mexican citizens to charge
them with capital murder. 180 It is fairly obvious that the intent of those
officers was to avoid the procedure established in the Extradition Treaty
and to trample the civil rights of the Mexican citizens in violation of the
treaty limitation on capital punishment, as Mexico does not provide for
capital murder.18
According to the Extradition Treaty, the requested state has discre-
tion to deliver its own nationals or to prosecute them itself.1 82 This dis-
cretionary right of the requested State would be phony if abductions are
not contrary to the Extradition Treaty. This substantially affects the civil
rights of suspects as well. Mexican citizens accused of committing an
offense in Mexican territory, like Alvarez-Machain, may be deprived of
the opportunity to be judged by their peers.
The procedure for extradition described in the treaty 183 would be
176. Id. art. 5, §§ 1, 3, 31 U.S.T. at 5063-64.
177. Id art. 7, 31 U.S.T. at 5064.
178. Id. art. 6, 31 U.S.T. at 5064.
179. Id. art. 8, 31 U.S.T. at 5065.
180. See Defendant's Motion for Judicial Notice, State v. Morales, No. 53100 (Jefferson
County, TX 1989); Defendant's Motion to Hold Article 37.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure Unconstitutional and Void, State v. Ayalla, No. 53101 (Jefferson County, TX 1989)
(copies on file with the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly).
181. See sources cited supra note 180.
182. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 2, art. 9, §§ 1, 2, 31 U.S.T. at 5065.
183. Id. arts. 10, 12, 13, 31 U.S.T.'at 5066-69. These procedures include a request made
through diplomatic channels, a description of the offense, a warrant of arrest or sentence, any
additional evidence, and authentication made by diplomatic or consular authorities. Id.
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seriously affected if kidnapping of suspects were not considered a pro-
scribed criminal practice. Indeed, these procedural safeguards provide
the individual the opportunity to challenge the deprivation of his or her
liberty in the country where it occurs. Otherwise, the suspect would be
unable to object to either the procedure of extradition or his arrest. The
process of extradition must be conducted before a federal judge of the
requested state in accordance with its legislation."' 4
Finally, another important right of the suspect-the "rule of spe-
cialty" (that an extradited person may not be tried for an offense other
than that for which the extradition was granted)' 8 5-would be seriously
impaired if kidnapping were accepted under the treaty. With kidnap-
ping, the seizing government does not have to state any basis for re-
moval, and is free to charge the suspect with any crime. It is impossible
to understand any of the clauses of the Extradition Treaty if abduction of
suspects is not considered a violation of the treaty. Kidnapping is not
only contrary to the nature, goals, and purposes of the treaty, it is so
destructive of its intent that it makes the treaty a meaningless
instrument.
3. Ker Is an Exception-Not the General Rule
The Supreme Court is wrong in its assertion that when the Extradi-
tion Treaty does not apply, the so-called "Ker rule" then applies.1" 6 The
rule of Ker v. Illinois'87 holds that kidnapping from a foreign country,
without any pretense of authority under an extradited treaty or from the
government of the United States, is not sufficient reason why the ab-
ducted party should not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of
the court which has the right to try him for such offense. 8
As concluded in the analysis above,"' even if the treaty did not ap-
ply, the rules of international law (either conventional or customary)
must apply because they are the Supreme Law of the Land. The "Ker
rule" cannot be considered a general rule, let alone a rule with authority
to derogate the principles of jus cogens, which are not only imperative,
but higher in rank than rules of domestic law. Previous court decisions
184. Id. art. 13, 31 U.S.T. at 5069.
185. Id art. 17, 31 U.S.T. at 5071-72.
186. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2197 (1992).
187. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
188. Id. at 443-44.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 127-133, 92, 139, 141.
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support the restrictive application of Ker.19° Ker's holdings should not
be applied to Alvarez-Machain because the two cases have distinctly dif-
ferent fact patterns.
In Ker v. Illinois, the question of violation of international law by
United States officers was not at stake. 191 Ker's kidnapping was per-
formed without any authority from the United States Government. 92
The case did not involve the a priori and a posteriori sanction of a viola-
tion of international law. In contrast, the question in the Alvarez-
Machain case concerned the content of the confidential memorandum of
the Justice Department authorizing international kidnapping, and the
validation of the abduction by United States law enforcement officers.
193
The Ker decision, based on significantly different facts, therefore does not
authorize government officers to violate the Extradition Treaty.194
The Ker decision expressly recognizes the need to respect interna-
tional law. The Ker Court stated that the controversy should be decided
by the rules of "common law" or of the "law of nations."' 95 In the ab-
duction of Ker, carried out by private citizens, the Court did not find any
positive violation of the laws of the United States, 196 including interna-
tional law as the Supreme Law of the Land. In contrast, the Alvarez-
Machain case involves a clear challenge to both customary and conven-
tional international law.
The Supreme Court decision in Ker paid respect to both the custom-
ary and conventional international law that existed at that time. The
decision was rendered prior to the enactment of the United Nations
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States. These instruments have since been applied to
protect other countries' sovereignty and the human rights of suspects.
Alvarez-Machain was decided after these enactments. The Second Cir-
190. See The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 371 (1824); United States v. Toscanino, 500
F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974); Villareal v. Hammond, 74 F.2d. 503, 505 (5th Cir. 1934); 1 Op.
Att'y Gen. 68, 69 (1797). See also Paust, The President is Bound, supra note 139, at 378.
191. Regarding the abduction of Toscanino from Uruguay, the court stated: "If distinc-
tions are necessary, Ker and Frisbie are clearly distinguishable on other legally significant
grounds which render neither of them controlling here. Neither case, unlike that here, involved
the abduction of a defendant in violation of international treaties of the United States." Tos-
canino, 500 F.2d at 277.
192. Ker, 119 U.S. at 443.
193. See supra note 107 (referring to Justice Department confidential memorandum of June
21, 1989).
194. Ker, 119 U.S. at 440.
195. Id. at 444.
196. Id. at 440.
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cult Toscanino'97 case was also decided after the enactment of these in-
ternational instruments, and acknowledged the United States
government's duty to comply with two international treaties and respect
the territorial sovereignty of Uruguay. 198
In Ker, the Court decided that the suspect, an American citizen who
had fled to Peru, failed to prove the existence of a right conferred by the
treaty.199 The Court arrived at that conclusion because the government
of Peru could have ordered Ker out of the country.2 "o This reasoning
does not apply to the Alvarez-Machain case because Alvarez-Machain
was not an escapee in a foreign country, but a national of the state where
the abduction took place. In Ker, Peru did not complain about the incur-
sion into its territory,2" while in Alvarez-Machain, Mexico formally pro-
tested the abduction and the violation of its sovereignty. 02
Another substantial difference between the Ker and Alvarez-
Machain cases is that in Ker the question was whether the suspect would
be prosecuted in American courts or not at all.2 03 In Alvarez-Machain,
the question was which country should prosecute the suspect. Addition-
ally, the Ker Court returned the controversy to the state court,2° while
the Alvarez-Machain Court sent the issue of repatriation to the executive
branch.20 ' The Alvarez-Machain case does not fit Ker, and the Ker
Court, unlike the Alvarez-Machain Court, attempted to follow then-cur-
rent international law.
Frisbie v. Collins,206 mentioned in Alvarez-Machain to support using
the Ker rule,20 7 is a case of domestic, not international kidnapping. In
Frisbie, officers from the State of Michigan kidnapped the suspect from
the State of Illinois.2 "8 No international treaty was at stake. The issue in
197. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
198. Id. at 277. The Toscanino court added that since the United States had agreed not to
seize persons residing within the territorial limits of Uruguay, Ker did not apply but Cook v.
United States did. Id. at 278 (citing Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933)). Cook stated
that the Government lacked the power to seize a vessel because, by treaty, it had imposed a
territorial limitation upon its own authority. See Cook, 288 U.S. at 121-22.
199. Ker, 119 U.S. at 443.
200. Id at 444.
201. Id. at 442.
202. 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2196 (1992).
203. Ker, 119 U.S. at 441-42.
204. See id. at 444. Additionally, the Ker Court recognized Ker's right to sue for trespass
and false imprisonment. Id
205. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2196.
206. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
207. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2192. The Court in Alvarez-Machain mentioned that
in Frisbie v. Collins, the rule of Ker was applied to a case in which the defendant had been
kidnapped in Chicago by Michigan officers and brought to trial in Michigan. Id.
208. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 520.
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Frisbie was the violation of the Federal Kidnapping Act in light of the
Fourteenth Amendment.20 9 In contrast, the international elements of Al-
varez-Machain must be contemplated pursuant to international law as
the Supreme Law of the Land in the United States. It does not make
sense to see Fisbie, which is ruled by Fourteenth Amendment principles,
as a limit on international law principles, and controlling in Alvarez-
Machain.
4. Kidnapping Is Contrary to International Law
The Supreme Court holding that a bilateral extradition treaty pro-
hibits kidnapping only when it contains an express clause to that effect is
based on a double misunderstanding: Mexico was aware (a) of the Ker
doctrine since 1906, and (b) of the 1935 Harvard proposal to include an
express clause in extradition treaties to prohibit abductions.21 0
Mexico, when signing international treaties with the United States,
is not obliged to rely upon the American domestic courts' interpretations
of legal instruments. It would make more sense for Mexico to rely on its
own courts' interpretations of rules of international law. It would be
even more reasonable for any country to rely on the criteria of interpreta-
tion produced by the International Court of Justice, the United Nations,
and the Organization of American States. In any case, it appears that the
Supreme Court of the United States misapplied Ker, which expressly rec-
ognized the need to honor international law principles.2 11
Mexico is likewise not obliged to rely on the 1935 Harvard proposal.
It is an academic instrument without the authority of any international
organization. Even within the academic community in the United States,
there is widespread support for the position that kidnapping is an unlaw-
ful measure and contrary to the purpose and goals of extradition trea-
ties.212 Thus, there is no need to add a clause expressly prohibiting
209. Id.
210. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194-95 nn.11, 13. In the Harvard Draft Conven-
tion, the advisory committee proposed the following language:
In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall prosecute or punish
any person who has been brought within its territory or a place subject to its author-
ity by recourse to measures in violation of international law or international conven-
tion without first obtaining the consent of the State or States whose rights have been
violated by such measures.
Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to
Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 442 (Supp. 1935) (quoted in Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2195
n.13).
211. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886).
212. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 39, §§ 431-433.
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abductions.2 13 Indeed, the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations
Law plainly stated that a state's jurisdiction to take enforcement action
within its territory is normally exclusive, and a state shall not violate the
rights of another state under international law while exercising
jurisdiction.214
The Harvard proposal for the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
with Respect to Crime aimed to provide printed life to what already ex-
isted in customary international law and later was incorporated in other
multilateral treaties. Thus, even if the 1935 Harvard clause is not ex-
pressly incorporated in a bilateral extradition treaty, the content of that
clause is still mandatory for any country and fairly implied in treaties
because it is an expression of both conventional and customary interna-
tional law.
The Supreme Court, when referring to the need for including in ex-
tradition treaties the clause of the Harvard Research in International
Law that prohibits abductions, relied on the "Draft Convention on Juris-
diction With Respect To Crime," not on the "Draft Convention on Ex-
traditions. ' 215 The latter, published simultaneously with, and by, the
same institute as the former, does not contain any explicit clause prohib-
iting kidnapping, because kidnapping was and is already contrary to in-
ternational law and to any extradition treaty. Indeed, even the United
Nations Model Treaty on Extradition does not include an express clause
prohibiting abductions.2 1 6 It is simply assumed that they are
impermissible.217
The Supreme Court failed to realize that treaties, customary interna-
tional law, and federal statutes have the same rank as Supreme Law of
the Land in accordance with Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States
Constitution. Fortunately, the Supreme Court did not expressly deny
that customary international law is the Supreme Law of the Land, nor
213. See Bassiouni, International Extradition, supra note 38, at 10. See generally Bas-
siouni, Unlawful Seizures, supra note 50.
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 20 cmts. b, c (1965). This document was the updated instrument during the signing of the
Extradition Treaty. The Restatement makes clear statements toward the respect of other
countries' sovereignty rights, and the law of international human rights. RESTATEMENT,
supra note 39, §§ 431-433.
215. See Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Extradition, 29 AM.
LINT'L L. 21 (supp. 1935).
216. See G.A. Res. 45/116, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/45/756
(1991).
217. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 277 (2d Cir. 1974); S.C. Res. 138, U.N.
SCOR 15th Sess., 868th mtg., at 4, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960); RESTATEMENT, supra note 39,
§§ 432 n.1, 433; Letter from William L. Marcy, Secretary of State, to Mr. Hilsemann (Sept.
26, 1853), reprinted in 2 WHARTON, supra note 69, at 483-86.
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state that the President is not bound. Only the issue of proper interpreta-
tion of the bilateral treaty was raised. Thus, it is still possible for an
abducted person to introduce these issues in U.S. courts by filing for re-
lief on the basis that an abduction transgresses both customary and con-
ventional international law in violation of the United States Constitution.
Because states must comply with their treaties, kidnapping violates
the Extradition Treaty, and the Ker exception does not apply, thus the
Alvarez-Machain case was wrongly decided.
V. The Possible Solutions
A. The United States Constitution Article VI, Clause 2 and the
Exclusionary Rule
The constitutionality of the police action in the kidnapping of Alva-
rez-Machain can be challenged on the basis of its violation of both cus-
tomary and conventional international law.
The Executive Branch has interpreted the Extradition Treaty as not
prohibiting kidnapping. This interpretation contradicts the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, which mirrors customary international
law. Several treaties were signed by the United States after Alvarez-
Machain's abduction that support the objectives of the Bilateral Extradi-
tion Treaty.2"8 These international instruments all codify preexisting
rules of customary international law prohibiting police or other enforce-
ment functions in the territory of another state.219 There is a diversity of
other instruments containing rules of customary international law that
were all violated by the Alvarez-Machain kidnapping.220
218. RESTATEMENT, supra note 39, § 329. See U.N. Convention, supra note 35, art. 2, § 3,
28 I.L.M. at 500. This instrument came into force for the United States on November 11,
1990. The Alvarez-Machain abduction occurred before that date. See also Treaty of Coopera-
tion for Mutual Legal Assistance, Dec. 9, 1987, U.S.-Mex., art. I, § 2, 27 I.L.M. 443, 447
(1988). This instrument entered into force for the United States on May 3, 1991. See also
Agreement on Cooperation in Combatting Narcotics Trafficking and Drug Dependency, Feb.
23, 1989, U.S.-Mex., art. I, § 3, 29 I.L.M. 58, 59 (1990). This convention entered into force for
the United States on November 11, 1990.
219. The states in whose territories international abductions and other sovereignty trans-
gressions have occurred protested such actions as violations of international law. See RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 39, § 432 n.1. For example, in 1973 an Italian inspector was arrested
in Switzerland for conducting investigations in Swiss soil. Another Italian officer was indicted
in France for wounding a suspect while in the course of making an arrest. Two French offi-
cials were arrested and convicted in Switzerland for committing prohibited acts in favor of a
foreign state. Id. See also Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933); The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 362 (1824); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 69 (1797). For incidents involving complaints made
by the United States, see 4 MOORE, supra note 105, § 603.
220. See, eg., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 51, arts. 3, 5, 9, 10.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 51, arts. 7, 9 (1)-(4), 10;
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As stated in Weeks v. United States:221
the efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor
and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fun-
damental law of the land.222
The same rationale applies to the Alvarez-Machain case. A poison-
ous fruit (obtained in violation of the Constitution) cannot constitution-
ally be used by the prosecution at trial. This was pointed out in United
States v. Toscanino:223
[W]hen an accused is kidnapped and forcibly brought within the
jurisdiction, the court's acquisition of power over his person repre-
sents the fruits of the government's exploitation of its own miscon-
duct.... [W]e must be guided by the underlying principle that the
government should be denied the right to exploit its own illegal
conduct.224
The act of kidnapping, the executive branch interpretation that kid-
napping is not against the Supreme Law of the Land, and the Supreme
Court's suggestion that the executive branch's actions are not bound by
customary international law all violate the spirit of the United States
Constitution. Since customary international law is the Supreme Law of
the Land,225 rights or duties acquired or contracted under it are secured
by the Constitution. The Supreme Court stated in Weeks:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the coun-
try to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and en-
forced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting
accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights se-
cured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the
judgements of the courts which are charged at all times with the
support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions
have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental
rights.2
26
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 7(2)-(6), 8(1), 1144 U.N.T.S.
123 (Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica). In 1981, the United Nations Human Rights Committee
decided that the abduction of a Uruguayan refugee from Argentina by Uruguayan officers
constituted arbitrary arrest and detention in violation of article 9 (1). See U.N. GAOR Hum.
Rts. Comm., 36th Sess., Supp. (No. 40), at 176-84 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/R. 12/52 (1981). See
also RESTATEMENT, supra note 39, § 432 n.1. In addition to violating the Extradition Treaty,
the United States also transgressed the United Nations Charter and the OAS Charter.
221. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
222. Id. at 393.
223. 500 F.2d 267 (2d. Cir. 1974).
224. Id. at 275 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)).
225. Paust, Customary International Law, supra note 135, at 78.
226. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392.
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In reference to violations of the Fourth,2 27 Fifth,228, Sixth 229 and
Fourteenth230 Amendments, the United States Supreme Court justified
the exclusionary rule as the only effective deterrent to lawless police ac-
tion.23 1 As the Court noted in Mapp v. Ohio:2 3 2 "[ilf the fruits of an
unconstitutional search had been inadmissible [ab initio] in both State
and federal courts, this inducement to evasion would have been sooner
eliminated.1233
In sum, three conclusions can be extracted from Mapp, Weeks and
Toscanino: a) there is a need to protect the fundamental principles of the
Constitution; b) human rights must be respected (especially those con-
cerned with due process, arbitrary detention, and seizure); and c) the
need to preserve constitutional principles and protect substantial human
rights requires enforcement of the exclusionary rule to limit unlawful po-
lice actions.2 34 Under these foundational cases, it is impossible to con-
clude that the human rights of an abducted person are not substantially
transgressed by kidnapping.23 Therefore, exclusion would be the most
effective deterrent for the opprobrious practice of international
kidnapping.
In addition to exclusion, reparation is an essential restorative rem-
edy to help neutralize the human rights violations suffered by the kid-
napped suspect. The concept of reparation or restitution was defined by
the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzdw Factory
case:
2 36
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal
act-a principle which seems to be established by international
practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals-is
that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the conse-
quences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would,
227. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 633-637 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
658 (1961).
228. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966).
229. Id.
230. See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 633-637; Mapp, 367 U.S. at 658.
231. See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 633-637; Mapp, 367 U.S. at 658.
232. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
233. Id. at 658.
234. Id.
235. In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), the Supreme Court held
that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to foreigners who have not developed a sufficient
connection with the United States to be considered part of the community. Id. at 264-66 How-
ever, the United States is obligated to respect foreigners' human rights by the United Nations
Charter, the OAS Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact
of San Jose, Costa Rica).
236. Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol0.) 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 4 (Sept. 13).
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in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed.237
This international law concept of reparation is compatible with the
application of the exclusionary rule. Applying both rules together
would, in kidnapping cases, bar prosecution and guarantee return of the
abducted person to the place of abduction.23
B. Other Solutions
Other solutions could prevent international abductions. While the
object of this article is to explain how the practice of kidnapping is a
violation of both conventional and customary international law, and thus
a violation of the Supreme Law of the Land of the United States, the
following solutions deserve mention.
1. Adding a Clause Prohibiting Kidnapping to Extradition Treaties
An obvious solution would be to add a clause prohibiting kidnap-
ping to the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty. There are some
reasons to believe that adding such a clause is not a necessity. It has been
demonstrated, theoretically kidnapping is against the nature and purpose
of extradition treaties and the Charters of United Nations and the Organ-
ization of American States.
There should be no need to have such a clause because the prohibi-
tion of international kidnapping is necessarily implied from the text of
any extradition treaty. However, such a clause is useful for Mexico and
other countries in order to protect their territorial sovereignty and may
be helpful to define sanctions against international kidnappers.239
There are about one hundred extradition treaties binding the United
States. The practice of reforming one of them with such a clause should
not lead police officers to believe they are allowed to perform abductions
in countries which have not added that clause. The same applies for
states which have signed extradition treaties but have not added the
clause.
2. Prosecuting Police Officers as Kidnappers
The Mexican government could opt to arrest American police of-
237. Id. at 47.
238. See 4 MOORE, supra note 105, § 432 n.1.
239. At the present time, there are negotiations between the U.S. and Mexico toward a new
extradition treaty, "one that plainly outlaws kidnapping as a means for moving suspects in
criminal cases across a border." 'No Mas' Legalized kidnapping a blot on Mexico relations,
Hous. CHRON., editorial, June 23, 1993, at A14. See Nuevo Tratado de Extraditidn con EU,
Prohibird Secuestros Transfronterizos: SRE, EXCELSIOR, July 29, 1993, at Al.
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ficers24 who attempt to kidnap suspects in Mexican territory. Kidnap-
ping is a crime described by the Mexican Penal Code and there are
decisions from American courts which state that the kidnappers can be
extradited to the country where they committed the crime.24
Although arresting, prosecuting, or extraditing American police of-
ficers who kidnap Mexican citizens would likely reduce this unlawful
practice, other actions must be taken. For example, after the Alvarez-
Machain decision, the Mexican Congress approved a reform to the Mexi-
can Federal Penal Code adding to the crime of treason the action com-
mitted by any Mexican citizen who assists an international abduction.
3. The Organization of American States
The Permanent Council of the Organization of American States re-
quested a legal opinion from the Inter-American Juridical Committee
about the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Alvarez-
Machain case.242 Not surprisingly, the Inter-American Juridical Com-
mittee condemned the United States Supreme Court decision.
The Inter-American Juridical Committee stated that the domestic
rules of a state cannot be invoked to avoid compliance with international
obligations-the state should answer for violations of international law
committed by its executive branch, or any other branch, including the
judiciary.243 The Committee affirmed that kidnapping is a grave viola-
tion of international law and a transgression of the sovereignty of Mexi-
can territory. 2" They also stated that the United States is responsible for
this violation because, while knowing of the actions of the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency (which committed the abduction), it did nothing to reverse
the unlawful action. The Committee added that the United States has
not honored the principle that treaties need to be interpreted in light of
their purpose and ends, and in accordance with international law.245 Fi-
nally, the Committee said the Court's decision could hopelessly damage
240. United States police officers have no status as law enforcement officers when on for-
eign soil.
241. For references to penalization of the crime of kidnapping in Mexico, see supra note 49.
On January 11, 1988, Secretary of State George Schultz and the Canadian Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs signed a protocol amending the Treaty on Extradition between the United
States and Canada. In an exchange of letters, the two secretaries recognized that the trans-
border abduction of persons to the United States by civilian agents of bailbonding companies
was an extraditable offense under the treaty. Marian N. Leich, Contemporary Practices of the
United States Relating to International Law, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 337, 337 (1988).
242. O.A.S. CP/Res. 586 (909/92) (July 15, 1992).
243. See O.A.S. CJI/Res. 11-15/92 (Aug. 15, 1992) at 5.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 7.
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the international juridical order if every state is deemed to have the au-
thority to violate the sovereignty of other states.246 Indeed, kidnapping is
incompatible with the right of every person to due process, one of the
fundamental human rights protected by international law.
Even though the opinion of the Inter-American Juridical Committee
has no authority to change the decision of the United States Supreme
Court, that opinion is keeping with the rules of both customary and con-
ventional international law. It is useful evidence of what international
law says about kidnapping, and in the future it could be persuasive au-
thority before United States federal courts or international courts or
commissions.
4. The United Nations
One of the most important purposes of the United Nations is to pro-
mote international cooperation and respect for international law and
human rights.247 Both the General Assembly and the Security Council
can request an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice
about the Alvarez-Machain case."' The decision of the United States
Supreme Court caused much concern in the world community regarding
the views of the United States on several areas of international law, in-
cluding the principles of interpretation of treaties, incorporation of cus-
tomary international law into domestic law, respect for international
human rights, and respect for other countries' sovereignty.249 It appears
that Mexico would have strong international support to bring these is-
sues to the General Assembly and eventually to the Security Council.250
There are good reasons to think that an Advisory Opinion requested
from the International Court of Justice would be no different than the
Opinion of the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organization
of American States.251 The facts and the legal principles at stake are the
246. Id.
247. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
248. U.N. CHARTER art. 96. The Sixth Commission has recommended that the General
Assembly request a consultive opinion from the International Court of Justice about the issue
involved in the Alvarez-Machain case. Request for an Advisory Opinion from the International
Court of Justice: Report of the Sixth Committee, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 47th Sess., Agenda
Item 151, U.N. Doe. A/47/713 (1992).
249. See supra notes 11-28.
250. The United States has veto power in the Security Council, as do the other four perma-
nent members (China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom). However, this does not
mean that the United States would necessarily block an effort to obtain clarification from the
International Court of Justice. The United States voted affirmatively on the resolution con-
demning Israel in the case of Adolf Eichmann. See S.C. Res. 138, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess.,
868th mtg., at 4, U.N. Doe. S/4349 (1960).
251. See O.A.S. CJI/Res. 11-15/92 (Aug. 15, 1992) at 4-7.
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same. The decision of the Organization of American States represents
the vision of an international organization. Furthermore, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice would base its Advisory Opinion on bilateral and
multilateral treaties and customary international law.252
After obtaining an Advisory Opinion from the International Court
of Justice, the General Assembly could recommend measures for the
peaceful arrangement of a solution253 or to promote better development
of international law and the realization of human rights.254 If the Inter-
national Court of Justice provided its advisory opinion to the Security
Council, the Security Council then could submit the Report to the Gen-
eral Assembly for its consideration and action.255
5. Tort for Violation of International Law
According to Section 1350 of the United States Judicial Code, "dis-
trict courts... have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States. '2 56 This statute authorizes aliens to sue for a tort
committed in violation of customary international law257 or international
treaties. 25 8 The statute was designed as a remedy for "territorial injuries
to aliens, whether committed by U.S. authorities or citizens or by for-
eigners; ... extraterritorial injuries to aliens committed by U.S. citizens,
officials or instrumentalities, and.., injuries to aliens bearing such other
direct nexus as to make the United States responsible for them ... ,,2"9
Kidnapping victims may have some civil recourse through tort remedies.
In Jaffe v. Boyles,26 Jaffe (a Canadian citizen kidnapped by American
citizens to be brought to justice in Florida) sued his kidnappers under the
Alien Tort Act.261 Alvarez-Machain also has standing to sue his abduc-
tors on the basis of the violations committed under both conventional
and customary international law. Though the Torts Act would provide
compensation for the damage caused to the human rights of Alvarez-
252. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, § 1(a)-(d).
253. U.N. CHARTER art. 14.
254. U.N. CHARTER art. 13 § 1(a)-(b).
255. U.N. CHARTER arts. 24, 25.
256. Aliens Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988)
257. The original Alien Tort Statute was enacted in 1789. Although most contemporary
international instruments prefer to use the expression "customary international law," the cur-
rent version of the statute retains the expression "law of the nations." See 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1988).
258. See TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 78.
259. Jorge Cicero, The Alien Tort Statute of 1789 as a Remedy for Injuries to Foreign Na-
tionals Hosted by the United States, 23 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 315, 327 (1992).
260. 616 F. Supp. 1371 (C.D.N.Y. 1985).
261. d at 1374.
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Machain,262 "the only effective deterrent to lawless police action is the
exclusionary rule. 26
3
6. Statute Prohibiting International Kidnapping
Finally, legislation from the United States Congress specifying that
the President is bound by customary international law would help deter
governmental kidnapping. A specific statement that actions by the exec-
utive branch contrary to international law are illegal could lead to a more
appropriate expression of policy on the part of the executive. Before the
United States Congress can make such a law, it must be more conscious
of international law, other countries' sovereignty, and international
human rights.
Even if kidnapping is already contrary to international law, a con-
gressional act expressly prohibiting this opprobrious practice would deter
lawless police action. "If the Supreme Court will not compel the Execu-
tive to 'take care that the law [and the Constitution] be faithfully exe-
cuted' by closing the courts to the fruits of executive violations of
international law, Congress can do so." 2"
Conclusion
The 1992 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Alvarez-
Machain reflects the Court's current disdain for international law, and
failed to interpret the bilateral Extradition Treaty in light of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Charter of the United Nations,
and the Charter of the Organization of American States. This decision
damaged the sovereignty of Mexico and the international law itself.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court did not expressly deny that custom-
ary international law, and the above mentioned charters, are Supreme
Law of the Land. Only the issue of prior interpretation of the bilateral
treaty was raised. Thus, it is still possible for an abducted person to in-
troduce these issues in U.S. courts.
262. While the President and other United States officials can argue that they are immune
from the Alien Tort Act while acting within the scope of their functions, an argument can be
made that when these officers violate the Supreme Law of the Land, their actions are no longer
pursuant to their "official duties" at all. See Paust, Is the President Bound, supra note 75, at
766-72.
263. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 633-637 (1965).
264. Louis Henkin, Will the US. Supreme Court Fail International Law?, NEWSLETrER,
(Am. Soc'y of Int'l L., Washington, D.C.), Aug.-Sept. 1992, at 2. It is also suggested in this
article that the Congress could, in exercising its power to define offenses against the law of
nations, make international kidnapping a federal crime. Id
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On July 9, 1993, Alvarez-Machain filed law suit in Los Angeles,
California, alleging civil rights violations. This suit will force U.S. courts
to make a deeper reflection on the role of human rights, multilateral trea-
ties, and customary international law in trans-boundary abductions. In
the bilateral relationship between the United States and Mexico, there is
an extradition treaty which describes the existing safeguards to protect
individual human rights. Thus, extradition is the only way to obtain cus-
tody of a suspect who is physically in the other country without violating
his or her civil rights, customary international law, and the law of trea-
ties. Even the Ker court in 1886 expressly recognized Ker's right to sue
for trespass and false imprisonment.
International law, whether conventional or customary, is the
Supreme Law of the Land in the United States under its Constitution.
Three conclusions can be extracted from Mapp, Weeks and Toscanino:
(1) there is a need to protect the fundamental principles of the Constitu-
tion; (2) human rights must be respected (especially those concerned
with due process, arbitrary detention and seizure); and (3) the need to
preserve constitutional principles and protect substantial human rights
requires enforcement of the exclusionary rule to limit unlawful police
actions. The courts should close their doors to the fruits of what has
been obtained in violation of the Constitution.
In 1992, the International Law Commission of the U.N. proposed to
the General Assembly to request a Consultive Opinion from the Interna-
tional Court of Justice on the issue of international abductions. That
opinion, still to come, would be helpful for defining what international
law is on these matters and for the correct interpretation of international
treaties.

